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CARVING MIND AT BRAIN’S JOINTS. 
THE DEBATE ON COGNITIVE 
ONTOLOGY1
abstract
Since neuroimaging methods allow researchers to study the human brain at work, the vexed mind-
brain problem ceased to be just a metaphysical issue, and became a practical concern for Cognitive 
Neuroscientists: how could they carve mind and brain into distinct entities, and what is the relation 
between these two sets? In this paper, I discuss the classical model of one-to-one mappings between 
mental and neural entities, inherited from phrenology, and make its assumptions explicit. I then examine 
the shortcomings of this “new phrenology”, and explore two solutions to them: the first accepts many-to-
many mappings, whereas the second proposes a radically rethinking of the relata of this correspondence.
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In some cases, when thorny epistemological or foundational issues concerning some specific1 
science are addressed, the boundaries between philosophy and (that specific) science are 
blurred, and philosophical contributions cannot be distinguished from scientific discourse 
anymore – thus realizing a sort of Quinean ideal of continuity.
This is currently happening in the ongoing debate on cognitive ontology, where 
neuroscientists (e.g. Pessoa, 2014; Poldrack, 2010) and philosophers (e.g. the contributions 
in the special issue edited by Janssen et al., 2017) are discussing the proper role of 
neuroscientific evidence in determining what mental entities there are. In this paper I sketch 
a brief reconstruction of this debate, focusing on the controversial assumption of one-to-
one mapping between mental and neural entities. I will address the shortcomings of this 
assumption, and briefly describe an alternative framework that does without it. I will also 
discuss some attempts to save the one-to-one mapping hypothesis by revising the relata, i.e. 
by proposing that mappings occur between different entities from those that are usually 
conceived.
In some senses, the cognitive ontology debate is but the heir of the vexed Mind-Body problem. 
What kind of relationship holds between “the mental” and “the physical” is one of the most 
debated topics throughout the history of Western philosophy. However, as modern tools and 
techniques for studying the human brain and mind were developed, the Mind-Body problem 
has been (re)framed as a methodological question concerning the proper relation between 
psychology and neuroscience. Inheriting phrenologists Gall and Spurzheim’s bold thesis that 
some mental faculties are localized in some areas of the brain, filtered and refined by figures 
such as Broca, twentieth century neuropsychologists appealed to the co-occurrence between 
cognitive impairments and brain lesions (observed post-mortem) to establish some link 
between mental processes and neural areas. They also looked for counter-intuitive cases in 
which two (allegedly) unified systems could be selectively impaired in order to establish that 
they are independent on functional and (usually, though not always) structural grounds. The 
most famous case was that of memory: once thought to be a single capacity, the observation of 
1  I am grateful to Joe Dewhurst, Anneli Janssen and Colin Klein for their valuable comments, as well as for our 
many stimulating discussions. I am also indebted to three anonymous referees who helped me to ameliorate the 








brain lesioned patients led to its being split into different kinds, e.g. “declarative” vs “implicit” 
memory (see for instance Squire, 1992).
However, by the end of the twentieth century, several techniques were developed, that 
allowed scientists to study living human brains at work, either by measuring electrical 
signals on the scalp (EEG, MEG) or by assessing the metabolic activity of cortical areas (PET, 
fMRI). More recent techniques also allow researchers to produce temporary interferences 
on the activity of some brain areas (TMS, tDCS). Each of these techniques represents a new 
window2 through which the psychologist can peek at the brain at work. By accepting some 
bridge-principles, she can then use this new evidential source to add further constraints to 
her cognitive theories – each of them positing slightly different carvings-up of the mind (that 
is, different taxonomies of mental entities; see below). And so many did, thus giving rise to 
Cognitive Neuroscience.
A common feature of cognitive neuroscience is that neuroscience is deemed a legitimate 
arbiter for refining cognitive ontology, i.e. for choosing the right set of mental entities. This 
features rely on the following assumptions:
(1) the mind can be decomposed into distinct mental entities;
(2) the brain can be decomposed into distinct neural entities;
(3) some systematic correspondence holds between mental and neural entities.3
Assumptions (1) and (2) have both been challenged on the ground that mental and neural 
processes are too tightly interconnected to be studied in isolation (see e.g. van Orden and 
Paap, 1997). While not completely settled, a certain degree of decomposability of mind seems 
reasonably warranted by the successes of Cognitive Psychology, whereas the decomposability 
of the brain seems reasonable in virtue of the fact that neuropsychology has proved that the 
brain cortex is not equipotential. Moreover, albeit mechanistic explanations (regarded by 
most researchers as the proper kind of explanations in cognitive neuroscience) often begin 
with decomposition into parts (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993), they need not be insensitive to 
mutual interactions between such parts. Quite on the contrary, sophisticated mechanistic 
frameworks involve both a decomposition and a recomposition of phenomena, as well as a 
detailed characterization of the overall context (Bechtel, 2009).
Mind and brain can also be carved up independently of one another. This may result in 
several conflicting taxonomies. For example, the faculties posited by Thomas Reid differ 
from the systems described in modern psychology textbooks, and both are different from the 
taxonomies of folk psychology, which nonetheless underlie much of our everyday language 
about mind and behavior. Brains too can be carved along many joints: for instance, brain 
cartographers can distinguish among lobes, on the basis of gross spatial properties; or they 
can distinguish brain regions, according to either a single or a mix of properties such as their 
histology or their connectivity profiles (Mundale, 2009). Assumption (3) offers a possible way 
out from the underdetermination of both kinds of ontology, providing a (further) criterion for 
choosing one out of these many possible carvings: namely, it prescribes that we should choose 
2  Though they are very opaque windows. While we cannot address these topics here, it is worth remembering that 
each technique has its limitations, and that the assumptions necessary in order to interpret the data are far from 
being theoretically neutral. Rather than conceiving of them as tools for seeing brain activity, it is thus more prudent to 
conceive of neuroimaging techniques as tools for inferring brain activity. See e.g. Roskies (2008) and Klein (2010).
3  Notice that, while obviously easier to reconcile with a materialist metaphysics, assumption (3) does not entail it: all 
that is required is some kind of psycho-neural bridge principle. See Nathan & Del Pinal (2016).
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those that warrant systematic mappings between entities of each domain.4
Whilst assumptions (1-3) are arguably shared by every Cognitive Neuroscientist, they are often 
construed in different ways. In the following sections I distinguish and compare between two 
such ways, giving rise to two different ontological frameworks.
During the early years, and until recent criticisms have cast shadows upon them, the 
ontological desiderata underlying most studies in cognitive neuroscience were efficaciously 
stated by neuroscientists Price & Friston (2005), who claim that we should aim for “a 
systematic definition of structure–function relations whereby structures predict functions 
and functions predict structures” (p. 263). They stress that both functions and structures can 
be described at multiple levels of abstraction, and propose that the best level of abstraction 
is that which allows us to assign a single function to each structure (see also Rathkopf, 2013). 
Within this framework, assumptions (1-3) are thus specified as such:
(1a) the mind can be decomposed into distinct mental entities (m1, m2, … mn), i.e. mental 
functions;
(2a) the brain can be decomposed into distinct neural entities (n1,n2, … nn), i.e. neural 
structures;
(3a) a one-to-one mapping holds between each mental entity and a given neural entity 
(m1↔n1, m2↔n2, … mn↔nn).
This framework has been derogatorily dubbed The New Phrenology by some critics (notably, 
this is the title of Uttal’s 2001 book). Indeed, this label is not totally unreasonable: the practice 
of mapping mental entities to some neural entity was introduced by the phrenologists, and 
continued through the twentieth century thanks to the work of physicians such as Broca 
and Ferrier, who in turn passed it to modern scientists. Therefore, I shall call this ontological 
framework “neo-phrenology”.
However, modern neo-phrenologists differ from their ancestors in that they have thoroughly 
refined their ontology; they no longer try to associate the thickness of bumps on the skull to 
some of the disputable mental faculties posited by Gall, but rather seek to map inner neural 
regions to some mental function, i.e. usually psychological constructs that best fit the models 
of Cognitive Psychologists (Zawidzki & Bechtel, 2004).
Still, in our current ontology, virtually any attempt to map mental functions onto neural 
structures revealed a many-to-many mapping. Price and Friston are obviously aware that 
current theories are far from being as well ordered as they desire. But their claim is not meant 
to describe the current ontology. Rather, it is meant to play a heuristic function (Bechtel & 
McCauley, 1999), i.e. to prescribe how future ontologies should look (fig. 1).
4  Usually, reductionist philosophers assume that the relation between psychology and neuroscience is merely 
or mostly bottom-up, that is, it is only/mainly neuroscience that influences the psychological categories (e.g. 
Bickle, 2006). However, historically brain cartographies have been widely driven by considerations concerning the 
function, i.e. ultimately the psychological role of brain regions (see Hatfield, 2000). In drawing his notorious brain 
maps, Brodmann relied on histological criteria because “tissue elements of uniform specific structure, whether 
they are limited to a large or small cortical field or diffusely distributed over the whole cortex, must also have a 
uniform physiological function, and thus […] such elements are to be regarded as not only morphologically but also 
functionally equivalent” (2006, p. 5). Functional significance, along with anatomical criteria, is still at play in modern 








The moral of their story then is that, whenever there is no function-structure one-to-one 
relation, either the function or the structure (or both) are to be reformed or discarded. To put 
it into Lakatos’s (1970) terms, rather than giving up the core assumptions (1a-3a), we can “put 
the blame” on one of the following auxiliary assumptions:
(4) the correct set of mental functions is M = {m1, m2, … mn};
(5) the correct set of brain structures is N = {n1,n2, … nn}.
Either (4) or (5) or both are then replaced by either one or both the following auxiliary 
assumptions:
(4*) the correct set of mental functions is M* = {m*1, m*2, … m*n};
(5*) the correct set of brain structures is N* = {n*1,n*2, … n*n},
where ‘the correct set’ means ‘the set that is better at preserving (3)’ (fig. 2).  
Figure 1. A stylized representation of the ideal ontology envisaged by the neo-phrenology: both Mind and 
Brain are decomposed into a set of discrete entities, each one standing in a one-to-one mapping with a member 
of the other set.
Figure 2. Whenever one-to-one mappings cannot be established between the members of a set of mental 
entities M and those of a set of neural entities N, neo-phrenology tells us to discard either (or both), in favor of 
different sets M* and/or N*, in order to reestablish one-to-one mappings between mental and neural entities.
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For instance, the left posterior lateral fusiform gyrus has been associated with processing 
of visual words, and was thus called Visual Word Form Area. However, as Price and Friston 
report, this area is also engaged in processing the visual attributes of animals, and in tactile-
visual integration. Thus, they propose that a better functional label for that area is one that 
characterizes its working at a more abstract level: sensorimotor integration. Similarly, since 
the left inferofrontal gyrus (Broca’s area) is found to be activated in many domains outside 
the linguistic one, Tettamanti & Weniger (2006) propose to reconceive its function as a 
“supramodal hierarchial processor”. 
Yet, as Klein (2012) observes, a functional label as vague as ‘sensorimotor integration’ is not 
very informative, since “at some level of abstraction, that’s what nearly all of the cortex does” 
(p. 5). Thus, rather than some too-abstract-to-be-purposeful definition, Klein argues that 
functional labels for brain regions are only meaningful when they are considered in the light 
of some given context. He then construes this context as neural context, i.e. the set of areas 
that are co-activated. In the end, he comes up with a prudent endorsement of an ongoing shift 
of emphasis about the level at which functions and structures ought to be mapped: from single 
regions to many regions gathered into functional networks (Bressler & Menon, 2010).
Such a shift was also fostered by the development of Multi-Variate Pattern Analysis (MVPA), 
statistical techniques that allow scientists to compare activation patterns spread across the 
whole brain, instead of single regions (Haxby et al., 2014). The take-home message of such 
techniques is that the functional activity of the brain is better understood when complex 
arrays of activity are taken into account. Most of these MVPA employ machine learning 
techniques to perform what has come to be known as brain reading: in order to train a 
classifier to predict which cognitive function is performed from the corresponding neural 
activation, researchers “feed” it with functionally labelled patterns. After that, classifiers are 
shown unlabeled patterns of neural activation, and are asked to “guess” which one (among a 
given set) is the correct functional label, based on the similarity to the training set; a task in 
which they often succeed far above the chance level, sometimes even across different subjects. 
By applying such a method to a large database, Lenartowicz et al. (2010) investigated whether 
some cognitive constructs from the domain of control functions were mapped consistently to 
some specific and distinguishable activation pattern. As the classifier struggled to discriminate 
the pattern associated with “task switching” from those associated with some other 
constructs, the researchers suggest replacing “task switching” with some other constructs that 
map more neatly with some discriminable neural basis.
Notwithstanding the reforming attempts of some researchers, many-to-many function-
structure mappings are still ubiquitous. While Bechtel & Mundale (1999) claimed that Multiple 
Realizability vanished in the light of the empirical success of comparative Neuroscience, many 
mental functions turned out to be degenerate, i.e. they can be implemented by multiple brain 
structures – which, according to Figdor (2010), might sometimes count as multiple realizability. 
Meanwhile, while not equipotent, all brain regions are found to exhibit pluripotency, i.e. to be 
involved in the implementation of several (apparently) different mental functions.
Degeneracy and pluripotency contradict the one-to-one mapping assumption (3a), and 
therefore neo-phrenology regards them as two anomalies to deal with by revising the 
ontology. Yet, despite many years of reformistic efforts, including the shift from regions 
toward networks, degeneracy and pluripotency seem to be here to stay. The neuroscientist 
Pessoa (2014) pessimistically upholds that
the attempt to map structure to function on a one-to-one manner in terms of networks 






problem is simply passed along to a higher level. Thus, two distinct networks may 
generate similar behavioral profiles ([…] many-to-one); a given network will also 
participate in several behaviors (one-to-many) (p. 408).
Thus, some thinkers bite the bullet and try to sketch an ontological framework that does 
without one-to-one mappings. The most mature formulation up to date is presented in 
Anderson’s 2014 book After Phrenology (see also Barrett & Saptute, 2013). Stressing the often-
neglected phenomenon of neural plasticity, both at long and at short timescales, Anderson 
argues that brain structures have no such things as “intrinsic functions”. Rather, they get their 
functional significance depending on their structural characteristic, and on the partnership 
they institute with other neural structures, gathering into transient neural assemblies. 
Structures that usually play some role are thus commonly redeployed for other functions – a 
principle that Anderson dubs neural reuse.
Since neural reuse can hardly if ever be made consistent with one-to-one mapping, Anderson 
sketches a new protocol for linking mind and brain. The relation between brain and mind, he 
claims, could be established by measuring the functional dispositions of each neural structure 
(be it a region or a network), i.e. the likelihood that such structure gets (significantly) 
activated when some task is undertaken that bears the label of a given function or cognitive 
domain. In other words, (3a) is rejected and (3) is rather construed as (3b):
(3b) for each structure s, and for each function (or domain) f1, f2, … fn, there is a 
probability P that s is engaged (P (s,f1), P(s,f2), … P(s,fn)).
By exploiting available databases of neuroimaging data, it is possible to provide robust 
measurements of each structure’s disposition to be engaged in various functions/domains, 
obtaining what Anderson calls a functional fingerprint. Statistical dimension techniques 
could then be used to “dig out” similarities, and cluster related functions into what he calls 
Neuroscientifically Relevant Psychological (NRP) factors – which Anderson presents as an analogue 
of “personality traits” for neural structures.
An interesting feature of this approach is that, because the only direction of ontological 
revision is from brain data to mental categories, it might spur radical revisions in 
psychological taxonomies, leading to notice similarities and distinctions that could have been 
otherwise foreshadowed by our folk psychological prejudices.
Groundbreaking as it is, this post-phrenological framework has its weak spots too. For 
instance, it is very conservative with respect to neural ontology (McCaffrey & Machery, 2016), 
i.e. it does not offer incentives to find new and more interesting neural entities (see below). 
Moreover, whenever different functions are inadvertently given the same functional label 
(which is frequent across different labs; see Sullivan, 2016), Anderson’s big data approach 
seems ill suited to recognize the distinction (Kaplan & Craver, 2016). Nonetheless, since 
it is still in its infancy, no doubt post-phrenology will arguably address these and other 
shortcomings. Would neo-phrenology be completely supplanted by post-phrenology, or can 
the old framework still be saved somehow?
While many are pessimistic about the fate of one-to-one mapping (3a), I think that it is worth 
attempting to rescue it, in order not to throw the baby out with the bath water. As stressed 
by Bechtel & McCauley (1999), even gross function-structure mappings, inasmuch as they 
approximate the truth, may provide the basis for posing further research questions. For 
instance, while a claim such as “vision happens in the striate cortex” is largely imprecise, it 
was a starting point for further finer-grained models. Thus, once properly refined, one-to-one 
4. What Reforms 
(If Any) Can Save 
Neo-Phrenology?
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mapping might still represent a viable heuristic for prompting ontological revisions.
Whilst much emphasis has been placed upon revising mental entities, revising the neural 
entities might also be possible. Indeed, while both lesion studies and neuroimaging biased 
researchers toward assuming contiguous brain regions as the basic entities, due to their spatial 
resolutions, it is possible that two (or more) functionally coherent and intertwined neural 
populations can co-exist within what is currently classified as “the same” brain region.
McCaffrey (2015) stresses that various areas labelled as multifunctional (i.e. pluripotent) 
might differ in their mechanistic organization, thus requiring various explanatory strategies: 
some areas contain different structures, and thus require the abovementioned “divide-and-
conquer” approach; others conserve the same role in different tasks, thus qualifying for a 
more abstract redefinition of their function such as that advocated by Price & Friston (2005, 
see §3); but for yet other areas, context-sensitive mappings are unavoidable.
Therefore, perhaps replacing some specific set of either or both of mental function and/or of 
neural structure (i.e., replacing either or both assumptions 4a and 5a with 4b and 5b) might be 
insufficient. A more productive approach may be that to stop seeking one-to-one mappings 
between structures and functions, and rather pick some wholly different kind of neural and/
or mental entities. After all, this is how phrenology turned into neo-phrenology. For instance, 
after having stressed that a same set of brain regions could support several functions, Pessoa 
(2014) speculates that different functions can be due to differences in the strengths of the 
connections between them, or by the different time course of their activation.
Similarly, in Viola & Zanin (forthcoming) I proposed another kind of reform in neural 
ontology, i.e. dropping
(2a) the brain can be decomposed into distinct neural entities (n1,n2, … nn), i.e. neural 
structures,
and replacing it with
(2b) the brain can be decomposed into distinct neural entities, i.e. neural processes (p1,p2, 
… pn),
and further specifying that
(6) each neural process p is defined as the activity of some (set of) neural structure(s) n 
when acting according some way of working w (n=s,w).
The notion of a “way of working” is introduced in order to account for the intuition that 
the same part (or set of parts) of a mechanism can implement multiple functions (Bechtel & 
Abrahamsen, 2005). This proposal thus implies that the functions of brain mechanisms, rather 
than their parts, should be the relata of one-to-one mappings.
Admittedly, “way of working” is a vague notion. Given that, paraphrasing Price and Friston, 
we want to be able to predict functions from structures plus something (and vice versa), we 
cannot discriminate distinct ways of working on the basis of their contribution to mental 
functions, since that would entail a circularity. Rather, we need some purely neural marker 
for discriminating ways of working. In Viola & Zanin (forthcoming) I tentatively adopted 
the suggestion advanced by Siegel et al. (2012, p. 121) that “frequency-specific correlated 
oscillations in distributed cortical networks may provide indices, or ‘fingerprints’, of the 
network interactions that underlie cognitive processes”. Therefore, I proposed that different 
oscillatory patterns represent distinct ways of working.
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The expected outcome of such framework might be represented as in fig. 3:
Figure 3. The revision of the neo-phrenology proposed in Viola & Zanin (forthcoming). The ms, ns,ws, and ps 
represent, respectively, mental functions, neural structures (or sets of neural structures) and ways of workings, 
which I propose to construe in term of neural oscillations. Mental functions cannot be put into one-to-one 
correspondences with (sets of) neural structures anymore; rather, (sets of) neural structures become one of the 
two properties that define neural processes, along with a specific way of working.
Such a strategy allows us to reconcile pluripotency and one-to-one mapping. However, 
notwithstanding this specific proposal, I am more concerned with demonstrating that, 
notwithstanding its anomalies, neo-phrenology (of some evolved version, say neo-
phrenology*) can still play a role in Cognitive Neuroscience.
Ultimately, as suggested by Anderson and Pessoa (among others), it is possible that the Brain-
Mind relation turns out to be so complex that no one-to-one mapping whatsoever will be tenable 
for organizing existent knowledge. In other words, it is not implausible that one-to-one mappings 
will eventually vanish from the context of justification. Even so, hypothesizing and testing some 
sophisticated one-to-one mapping might still play some role in the context of discovery, e.g. by 
challenging the researchers to reshape the taxonomical landscapes of mind and brain.
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